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The Grand Pessimistic Induction 
 
Abstract 
After decades of intense debate over the old pessimistic induction (Laudan, 1977; Putnam, 
1978), it has now become clear that it has at least the following four problems. First, it 
overlooks the fact that present theories are more successful than past theories. Second, it 
commits the fallacy of biased statistics. Third, it erroneously groups together past theories 
from different fields of science. Four, it misses the fact that some theoretical components of 
past theories were preserved. I argue that these four problems entitle us to construct what I 
call the grand pessimistic induction that since the old pessimistic induction has infinitely 
many hidden problems, the new pessimistic induction (Stanford, 2006) also has infinitely 
many hidden problems. 
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1. Introduction 
Pessimists constructed the old pessimistic induction (Laudan, 1977; Putnam, 1978) and the 
new pessimistic induction (Stanford, 2006) to rebut scientific realism, the view that 
successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. After decades of intense debate 
between scientific realists and pessimists, it has now become clear that the old pessimistic 
induction has at least four problems. On the basis of the four problems, I construct what I call 
the grand pessimistic induction that since the old pessimistic induction has infinitely many 
hidden problems, the new pessimistic induction also has infinitely many hidden problems. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I expound the old pessimistic 
induction, four problems with it, and then new pessimistic induction. In Section 3, I unpack 
the grand pessimistic induction, delineating how it is structured, how it is justified, how it 
refutes the new pessimistic induction, and how it can be attacked. In Section 4, I anticipate 
and reply to five possible objections to the grand pessimistic induction. In short, this paper 
fleshes out and defends the grand pessimistic induction with the use of the very theoretical 
resources that pessimists have deployed to attack scientific realism. 
Let me first clarify some key terms. ‘Old pessimists’ and ‘new pessimists’ refer to 
those who embrace, respectively, the old pessimistic induction and the new pessimistic 
induction. ‘Pessimists’ refers to old and new pessimists. They are pessimistic about scientific 
theories and/or scientists. By contrast, ‘grand pessimists’ refers to those who embrace the 
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grand pessimistic induction. They are pessimistic about the old pessimistic induction, the new 
pessimistic induction, and pessimists. 
 
2. The Old and New Pessimistic Inductions 
The old pessimistic induction holds that since past theories were rejected, present theories 
will also be rejected. This formulation of the old pessimistic induction largely follows those 
of old pessimists. Larry Laudan asserts that most “of the past theories of science are already 
suspected of being false; there is presumably every reason to anticipate that current theories 
of science will suffer a similar fate” (1977: 126). Hilary Putnam similarly claims that just “as 
no term used in the science of more than fifty (or whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn 
out that no term used now (except maybe observational terms, if there are such) refers” 
(1978: 25).  
Why should we accept the premise of the old pessimistic induction that past theories 
were discarded? Old pessimists might appeal to Laudan’s list:1 
 
Laudan’s List 
- the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy;  
- the humoral theory of medicine;  
- the effluvial theory of static electricity; 
- “catastrophist” geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) deluge; 
- the phlogiston theory of chemistry; 
- the caloric theory of heat; 
- the vibratory theory of heat; 
- the vital force theories of physiology; 
- the electromagnetic aether; 
- the optical aether; 
- the theory of circular inertia; 
- theories of spontaneous generation (Laudan, 1981: 33) 
 
Laudan’s list plays a crucial role in the old pessimistic induction. Without it, the old 
pessimistic induction evaporates, for the premise would merely be an assumption.  
Let me introduce four objections that philosophers have raised against the old 
pessimistic induction. First, present theories are more successful than past theories, i.e., 
present theories explain and predict more phenomena than past theories did. This objection is 
raised by Alan Musgrave (1985: 211), Jarrett Leplin (1997: 141), Gerald Doppelt, (2007: 111, 
2014), Juha Saatsi (2009: 358), Michael Devitt (2011: 292), Ludwig Fahrbach (2011: 1290), 
Seungbae Park (2011: 80), and Moti Mizrahi (2013). On these philosophers’ account, the 
superiority of present theories over past theories invalidates the pessimistic inference from 
past to present theories. 
Second, Fahrbach (2011: 148), Park (2011: 79), and Mizrahi (2013: 3220, 2015, 
forthcoming) point out that the old pessimistic induction, based on Laudan’s list, commits the 
fallacy of biased statistics. The theories on the list were drawn from distant past science, but 
not from recent past science. The number of recent past theories, such as the germ theory, the 
special theory of relativity, the kinetic theory, and evolutionary theory, is far larger than the 
number of distant past theories, such as the humoral theory, the ether theory, the caloric 
                                           
1
 Laudan (1981: 33) presents the list not to support the old pessimistic induction but to undermine the alleged 
connection between success and approximate truth (Park, 2011: 76; Wray, 2015: 65, 2016: 366, footnote). 
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theory, and the phlogiston theory. Recent past theories have not yet been overturned, while 
distant past theories were overturned. 
Wray (2015) accepts the foregoing three philosophers’ criticism against the old 
pessimistic induction, although Wray (2013) vigorously defended the old pessimistic 
induction. He says that “if one focuses on the recent history of science, one may find that 
most theories have not in fact been rejected,” and that “only the fate of our most recently 
developed theories are relevant to determining what we can expect of today’s best theories” 
(2015: 63). On his account, we should consider recent past theories, but not distant past 
theories, to determine whether present theories will be overthrown. 
Third, Marc Lange (2002) observes that scientific revolutions occurred in different 
frequencies in different fields of science. For example, there were transitions of the various 
theories of light from Newton’s particle theory, to Fresnel’s wave theory, to Maxwell’s 
electromagnetic theory, to Einstein’s particle theory, and to the quantum theory of light. 
These four transitions occurred in less than 120 years between the early nineteenth century 
and the early twentieth century (Wray, 2015: 64). By contrast, the Ptolemaic theory remained 
unchallenged for about 1,200 years until the mid-sixteenth century (Wray, 2015: 64). 
Wray accepts Lange’s criticism of the old pessimistic induction, saying that pessimists 
should “be careful not to indiscriminately group together theories developed under very 
different circumstances, and thus generalize from an unnatural grouping” (Wray, 2015: 64). It 
is wrong to conclude that present theories in all fields of science will be rejected by appealing 
to a list of past theories drawn from all fields of science. We should rather take different 
epistemic attitudes towards different theories, depending on how often scientific revolutions 
have occurred in different fields of science. 
Fourth, selectivists claim that some theoretical components of past theories are retained 
in present theories, while other theoretical components were discarded. They disagree with 
one another over what the preserved components are. John Worrall (1989) claims that they 
are mathematical equations. Philip Kitcher (1993: 140–149) and Stathis Psillos (1999, 
Chapter 5 and 6) claim that they are working posits. Pierre Cruse and David Papineau (2002) 
claim that they are Ramsey sentences. Selectivists, however, agree that not all theoretical 
constituents of past theories were abandoned. 
Wray (2015: 69) is convinced of selectivism, approvingly citing Anjan Chakravartty, 
who says that “there appears to be a great deal of preservation of mathematical structure 
across theories over time” (Chakravartty, 2008: 155). For example, the mathematical 
structure of Fresnel’s ether theory was retained in Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, 
although the ontology of the ether theory was discarded. Thus, the old pessimistic induction 
“does not necessarily spell doom for scientific realism” (Wray, 2015: 70). 
Let me now turn to the new pessimistic induction that since past scientists could not 
conceive of present theories, present scientists cannot conceive of future theories. Why 
should we accept the premise that past scientists could not conceive of present theories? It is 
supported by Stanford’s list: 
 
Stanford’s List 
from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl’s phlogiston theory to Lavoisier’s 
oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary chemistry 
 
from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology 
 
from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories 
 
4 
from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and 
contemporary electromagnetism 
 
from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease 
 
from eighteenth century corpuscular theories of light to nineteenth century wave theories to the 
contemporary quantum mechanical conception 
 
from Darwin’s pangenesis theory of inheritance to Weismann’s germ-plasm theory to 
Mendelian and then contemporary molecular genetics 
 
from Cuvier’s theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species and 
from Lamarck’s autogenesis to Darwin’s evolutionary theory (Stanford, 2006: 19–20) 
 
As Laudan’s list is an indispensable foundation of the old pessimistic induction, so Stanford’s 
list is an indispensable foundation of the new pessimistic induction. Without Stanford’s list, 
the premise of the new pessimistic induction would merely be an assumption. 
Stanford claims that the space of unconceived alternatives “appears to be indeterminate 
and unbounded” (2006: 133). Each field of science has infinitely many unconceived 
alternatives. There are infinitely many theories of light, theories of diseases, theories of heat, 
and so forth. No matter how many alternatives scientists may eliminate from the spaces of 
unconceived alternatives, infinitely many unconceived alternatives will remain in the 
possibility spaces. Given that scientists are finite beings, they will never be able to exhaust 
the possibility spaces, and thus will never be able to reach and recognize true scientific 
theories. Therefore, realism is doomed. 
Stanford argues that the new pessimistic induction is better than the old pessimistic 
induction because the new pessimistic induction overcomes the realist objection to the old 
pessimistic induction that present theories are more successful than past theories. How does it 
overcome the objection? There is an important difference between the old and new 
pessimistic inductions. While the old pessimistic induction is over scientific theories, the new 
pessimistic induction is over scientists, i.e., while the old pessimistic induction is an inference 
from past to present theories, the new pessimistic induction is an inference from past to 
present scientists. Stanford claims that there is no relevant cognitive difference between past 
and present scientists. They are all “creatures whose cognitive constitutions are not well 
suited to the task of exhausting the kinds of spaces of serious candidate theoretical 
explanations from which our scientific theories are drawn” (Stanford, 2006: 45). So even if 
present theories are more successful than past theories, present theories will be displaced by 
unconceived alternatives, just as past theories were displaced by unconceived alternatives. It 
appears that Stanford thought up a clever way to get around the realist objection to the old 
pessimistic induction. 
 
3. The Grand Pessimistic Induction 
In the previous section, I highlighted four intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic 
induction. Those four problems, however, are not all the problems with it. There are other 
problems that have recently been recognized in the literature (Park, 2016a, 2017). I, however, 
do not spell them out in this paper because the four problems are enough to get the grand 
pessimistic induction off the ground, which I unfold in this section. 
The grand pessimistic induction holds that since the old pessimistic induction has 
infinitely many hidden problems, the new pessimistic induction also has infinitely many 
hidden problems. Why should we accept the premise that the old pessimistic induction has 
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infinitely many hidden problems? It is supported by the following list of intrinsic problems 
with the old pessimistic induction: 
 
The List of Problems 
- The old pessimistic induction overlooks the fact that present theories are more 
successful than past theories. 
- It commits the fallacy of biased statistics. 
- It erroneously groups together disparate past theories. 
- It misses the fact that some theoretical components of past theories were preserved. 
 
These four problems were hidden when the Laudan (1977) and Putnam (1978) put forward 
the old pessimistic induction. They were, however, exposed after decades of intense debate 
over it. There are even more problems with it, although we cannot see them now, i.e., it has 
hitherto hidden problems. As time goes, they will be exposed. The more such problems are 
exposed, the stronger the inductive rationale will become for thinking that there are further 
such problems. It follows that the number of such problems is infinite. Since the old 
pessimistic induction has infinitely many problems, its successor, the new pessimistic 
induction, also has infinitely many problems. Grand pessimists predict that the new 
pessimistic induction will be replaced by a future pessimistic induction hitherto unconceived. 
But the future pessimistic induction has infinitely many problems, just as its two forerunners 
do. There are infinitely many such future pessimistic inductions. So it is of no use for 
pessimists to construct the successors of the new pessimistic induction with the view to 
rebutting realism. 
Grand pessimists construct the list of intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic 
induction, but not the list of intrinsic problems with the new pessimistic induction. They 
argue that the list of intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic induction is all that is 
required to refute all the successors behind it, just as pushing the first domino is all that is 
required to knock down all the dominos behind it. To reject this analogy is to give up the 
pessimist program altogether. Therefore, this paper purposefully refrains from constructing 
the list of intrinsic problems with the new pessimistic induction. 
Recall that according to Stanford, the new pessimistic induction is better than the old 
pessimistic induction because it gets around the realist objection that present theories are 
more successful than past theories. Grand pessimists, however, object that the new 
pessimistic induction is no better than the old pessimistic induction. The two pessimistic 
inductions are equally problematic, given that they are both infinitely problematic. They are 
equally problematic, no matter how large finite number of advantages the new pessimistic 
induction may have over the old pessimistic induction. Thus, new pessimists’ appeal to 
infinity backfires on themselves. 
New pessimists might protest that they cannot see infinitely many problems with the 
new pessimistic induction. Grand pessimists, however, reply that new pessimists cannot see 
the infinitely many problems not because the new pessimistic induction does not have the 
infinitely many problems but because new pessimists are cognitively no better than old 
pessimists who could not see the infinitely many problems with the old pessimistic induction. 
Both old and new pessimists’ cognitive constitutions are not well suited to the task of 
exhausting the possibility spaces of hidden problems. Again, new pessimists are hoisted with 
their own petard. 
How can the grand pessimistic induction be attacked? To answer this question, we 
need to compare the two radically different ways in which past and present scientific theories 
are discredited under the pessimist framework. Pessimists reject past theories, such as 
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Aristotelian mechanics and the humoral theory not on the grounds that they had problematic 
predecessors but on the grounds that intrinsic problems with them were exposed. By contrast, 
they reject present theories, such as Einsteinian mechanics and the germ theory not on the 
grounds that intrinsic problems with them have been exposed but on the grounds that they 
have problematic predecessors. It follows that the grand pessimistic induction should be 
discredited either in the way past theories were discredited, or in the way present theories are 
discredited, depending on whether it has a problematic forerunner or not.  
The grand pessimistic induction does not even have a precursor, let alone a problematic 
precursor. After all, it is the first pessimistic induction about pessimistic inductions. So it 
should be discredited not in the way present theories are discredited but in the way past 
theories were discredited. To put it differently, you cannot run a pessimistic induction against 
the grand pessimistic induction. You should rather expose intrinsic problems with it. 
It is much harder to discredit the first idea than its successor. It may take more than a 
thousand years to expose intrinsic problems with the first idea, as the case of the Ptolemaic 
theory illustrates. By contrast, it takes less than a minute to discredit the second idea. All that 
is required to refute it to point out that it has a problematic precursor. The first idea enjoys 
what I call the first-mover advantage, viz., it is not subject to a pessimistic induction. In 
contrast, its successor falls prey to a pessimistic specter, the moment it is proposed, due to the 
fact that it has a problematic forerunner. The grand pessimistic induction enjoys the first-
mover advantage.  
 
4. Objections and Replies 
4.1. Behind the Old and New Pessimistic Inductions 
Pessimists might object that the grand pessimistic induction is a successor of the old and new 
pessimistic inductions, so the grand pessimistic induction has infinitely many problems, if the 
old and new pessimistic inductions have infinitely many problems. To use the domino 
analogy above, if the old pessimistic induction is knocked down, the new pessimistic 
induction and then the grand pessimistic induction will be knocked down. 
In my view, however, the idea that the grand pessimistic induction is a successor of the 
old and new pessimistic inductions is just as mistaken as the idea that the old pessimistic 
induction is a successor of past and present scientific theories. The old pessimistic induction 
is about past and present theories. How can it be their successor? No pessimist claims that 
since the caloric theory is refuted, the kinetic theory and then the old pessimistic induction 
will be refuted. In short, the old pessimistic induction is not behind but above past and 
present theories. Similarly, the grand pessimistic induction is about the old and new 
pessimistic inductions. How can it be their successor? It is not behind but above them. It 
follows that although the new and old pessimistic inductions are infinitely problematic, the 
grand pessimistic induction may not have a problem at all. In fact, the grand pessimistic 
induction can be free of a problem, provided that the old and new pessimistic inductions are 
infinitely problematic.  
 
4.2. Hasty Generalizations 
Pessimists might object that two hasty generalizations inhere in the grand pessimistic 
induction. First, it is a hasty generalization that since the old pessimistic induction has four 
problems, it has infinitely many hidden problems. Such an inference is similar to the 
fallacious inference that since we observed four black crows, there are infinitely many black 
crows. Second, it is also a hasty generalization that since the old pessimistic induction is 
infinitely problematic, the new pessimistic induction is also infinitely problematic. Such an 
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inference is similar to the fallacious inference that since we observed one black crow, the 
next crow is also black. 
Consider, however, that Stanford’s list includes the transition from the caloric theory to 
the kinetic theory. New pessimists maintain that there are infinitely many unconceived 
theories of heat on the grounds that they observed that there were two theories of heat in the 
history of science. Their inference is similar to the fallacious inference that since we observed 
two black crows, there are infinitely many black crows. New pessimists might reply that all 
past theories jointly constitute the reason for thinking that there are infinitely many theories 
of heat. Such a reply, however, is not available to new pessimists, for Wray earlier warned 
that pessimists should “be careful not to indiscriminately group together theories developed 
under very different circumstances, and thus generalize from an unnatural grouping” (2015: 
64). In sum, the grand pessimistic induction is no worse off than the new pessimistic 
induction vis-à-vis the charge of hasty generalization.  
Pessimists might accuse me of committing the fallacy of tu quoque. In general, we 
cannot show that an argument is good by saying that it is similar to a bad argument. If it is 
similar to a bad argument, it is a bad argument too. Thus, to say that the grand pessimistic 
induction is no worse off than the new pessimistic induction is to say that the grand 
pessimistic induction is incorrect. Specifically, the grand pessimistic induction commits the 
fallacy of hasty generalization, just as the new pessimistic induction does. 
This objection to the grand pessimistic induction, however, has two unsavory 
implications for pessimists. First, the objection implies that the new pessimistic induction 
commits the fallacy of hasty generalization. As such problems accumulate, a list of intrinsic 
problems with the new pessimistic induction might emerge. Second, the objection also 
implies that the old pessimistic induction commits the fallacy of hasty generalization. It is a 
hasty generalization that since the caloric theory was surpassed by the kinetic theory, the 
kinetic theory will also be surpassed by a hitherto unconceived alternative. It follows that we 
can expand the list of intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic induction as follows:  
 
The List of Problems 
- The old pessimistic induction overlooks the fact that present theories are more 
successful than past theories. 
- It commits the fallacy of biased statistics. 
- It erroneously groups together disparate past theories. 
- It  the fact that some theoretical components of past theories were preserved. 
          - It commits the fallacy of hasty generalization. 
 
Bear in mind that an attack on the grand pessimistic induction can also be directed at the new 
pessimistic induction, and can result in the expansion of the list of intrinsic problems with the 
old pessimistic induction. 
 
4.3. No Extrapolation 
Pessimists might object that it is wrong to extrapolate the fate of the new pessimistic 
induction from that of the old pessimistic induction. If the new pessimistic induction has 
hidden problems, that should be argued independently of the fact that the old pessimistic 
induction has hidden problems. In general, it is absurd to reason that an idea is problematic 
because it has a problematic predecessor.  
It is, however, self-defeating for pessimists to advance such an objection against the 
grand pessimistic induction because it applies equally well to the old and new pessimistic 
inductions. As noted before, pessimists operate under the assumption that scientific theories 
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are like dominos, i.e., that the downfall of past theories constitutes an inductive rationale for 
expecting the downfall of present theories. Under that framework, grand pessimists expect 
the demise of the new pessimistic induction after observing the demise of the old pessimistic 
induction. To reiterate, grand pessimists do not expose intrinsic problems with the new 
pessimistic induction, just as pessimists do not expose intrinsic problems with present 
theories. 
If pessimists, however, insist that the new pessimistic induction should be appraised 
independently of how the old pessimistic induction was evaluated, grand pessimists also 
insist that present theories should be appraised independently of how past theories were 
evaluated. Since another problem with the old pessimistic induction is just exposed, grand 
pessimists expand the list of problems as follows:  
 
The List of Problems 
- The old pessimistic induction overlooks the fact that present theories are more 
successful than past theories. 
- It commits the fallacy of biased statistics. 
- It erroneously groups together disparate past theories. 
- It  the fact that some theoretical components of past theories were preserved. 
          - It commits the fallacy of hasty generalization. 
- It mistakenly extrapolates the fate of present theories from that of past theories. 
 
The last item on the list is of immense importance. If it is true, the old pessimistic induction 
cannot go through, even if pessimists have a flawless list of past theories. That is, even if the 
list is large enough, representative of the population of past theories, and reflective of the 
disparate fields of science, it is entirely an open question whether present theories will follow 
the course of past theories or not. 
 
4.4. No Successor 
New pessimists might argue that the new pessimistic induction is not a successor of the old 
pessimistic induction, pointing out an important difference between them, viz., while the old 
pessimistic induction is about scientific theories, the new pessimistic induction is about 
scientists. So from the fact that the old pessimistic induction has hidden problems, it does not 
even probably follow that the new pessimistic induction also has hidden problems. 
The preceding move to drive a wedge between the old and new pessimistic inductions, 
however, does not go well with Stanford’s contention that the new pessimistic induction is 
better than the old pessimistic induction. He contends, you may recall, that the former 
overcomes, while the latter does not, the realist objection that present theories are more 
successful than past theories. His contention indicates that the new pessimistic induction is 
the successor of the old pessimistic induction. So if the latter has hidden problems, the former 
also has hidden problems. 
Moreover, if new pessimists say that the new pessimistic induction is not a successor of 
the old pessimistic induction, it is not clear on what grounds they can say that the kinetic 
theory is the successor of the caloric theory. After all, there is an important difference 
between them, viz., while the kinetic theory is about molecules, the caloric theory is about 
caloric. Despite this difference, however, new pessimists believe that the kinetic theory is the 
successor of the caloric theory. By parity of reasoning, they should also believe that the new 
pessimistic induction is the successor of the old pessimistic induction, although the former is 
over scientists while the latter is over scientific theories. 
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4.5. Science vs. Philosophy 
Pessimists will now argue that science and philosophy are different enterprises, and that 
scientific ideas and scientists are vulnerable to pessimistic inductions, whereas philosophical 
ideas and philosophers are not. To put another way, a pessimistic inference from some 
scientific ideas to other scientific ideas, or from some scientists to other scientists, is 
legitimate, but a pessimistic inference from some philosophical ideas to other philosophical 
ideas, or from some philosophers to other philosophers, is illegitimate. The old pessimistic 
induction is a pessimistic inference from some scientific ideas to other scientific ideas, and 
the new pessimistic induction is a pessimistic inference from some scientists to other 
scientists. Thus, the old and new pessimistic inductions are inductively correct. By contrast, 
the grand pessimistic induction is a pessimistic inference from a philosophical idea to another 
philosophical idea. So it is inductively incorrect.  
The preceding move to separate philosophy and science has the following four 
problems. First, an argument is required for the bold assertion that science is vulnerable to a 
pessimistic induction whereas philosophy is not. In the absence of such an argument, 
scientists would simply make the opposite assertion, viz., philosophy is susceptible to a 
pessimistic induction whereas science is not. Blunt scientists would add that it is the 
manifestation of philosophical arrogance to say that improvement and achievement ensue 
philosophers’ mistakes whereas further mistakes and failures ensue scientists’ mistakes (Park, 
2016b: 12). 
Second, grand pessimists protest that not all philosophical ideas are immune to a 
pessimistic induction. As we noted in Section 4, an idea is subject to a pessimistic induction 
or not, not depending on whether it is philosophical or scientific, but depending on whether it 
has a problematic forerunner or not. Some philosophical ideas, such as the new pessimistic 
induction, have precursors, whereas other philosophical ideas, such as the grand pessimistic 
induction, do not. So the new pessimistic induction falls prey to a pessimistic induction, 
whereas the grand pessimistic induction does not. To reiterate, the grand pessimistic 
induction enjoys the first mover advantage. 
Third, how about scientists and philosophers who practice their enterprises on the 
borderline between science and philosophy? For example, Sean Carroll at the California 
Institute of Technology is a theoretical physicist, but advocates diverse philosophical 
positions, including the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. Are such thinkers 
vulnerable to a pessimistic induction because they are scientists? Or are they immune to a 
pessimistic induction because they are philosophers? Pessimists owe us answers to these 
questions. 
Fourth, many philosophers rely on scientific theories to defend their philosophical 
views. For example, Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970: 172–173) uses evolutionary theory to defend 
his philosophical view about science. He argues that science does not move toward truths, 
just as biological organisms do not evolve toward a goal. Wray also relies on evolutionary 
theory to defend his philosophical view about science. He claims that old concepts are thrown 
out when an old scientific theory is superseded by a new scientific theory, just as a species 
loses some morphological features when it becomes a new species (Wray, 2011: 136). Are 
such philosophers’ philosophical views susceptible to a pessimistic induction or not? If they 
are, we have some examples of philosophical views that are susceptible to a pessimistic 
induction. But if they are not, we have an example of a scientific theory, viz., evolutionary 
theory, that is not susceptible to a pessimistic induction. Either way, it is false that the 
pessimistic specter pervades over science, but not over philosophy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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Worrall (1989: 99), Kitcher (1993: 136), Psillos (1999), P. D. Magnus and Craig Callender 
(2004: 322), and Wray (2013: 4321) claim that the old pessimistic induction is the most 
compelling argument against realism. Grand pessimists, however, dispute this popular 
assessment of the old pessimistic induction, arguing that it is infinitely problematic, and that 
its successor, the new pessimistic induction, is also infinitely problematic. 
The grand pessimistic induction would be refuted, if a list of intrinsic problems with it 
were presented. It is a matter for future debate whether such a list can be constructed. 
Pessimists should be careful, though, when they make such a list, for they might end up 
expanding the list of intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic induction, as we have already 
seen in Section 4. The grand pessimistic induction mirrors the new pessimistic induction, and 
the new pessimistic induction is similar to the old pessimistic induction. Hence, a criticism 
directed at the grand pessimistic induction can also be directed at the old pessimistic 
induction. Moreover, such a criticism can serve to generate a list of intrinsic problems with 
the new pessimistic induction, a list that I purposefully avoided constructing in this paper. 
Finally, it is also a matter for future debate what other hidden problems beset the old 
pessimistic induction. If they are exposed, they will be added to the list of intrinsic problems 
with the old pessimistic induction, will serve as positive instances confirming grand 
pessimists’ prediction that the old pessimistic induction has hitherto hidden problems, will 
strengthen the inductive rationale for thinking that there are yet more hidden problems, and as 
a result, will reinforce the grand pessimistic induction.  
In sum, we should shake off the initially appealing, but infinitely problematic, intuition 
that scientific revolutions will oust present theories, as they did past theories. 
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